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Who Is the ―Human‖ in Human Rights? The
Claims of Culture and Religion
PETER G. DANCHIN*

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of
brotherhood.
—Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)

Let me begin with a familiar line of critique in human rights
discourse which proceeds broadly as follows. Human rights, at least
in the specific form they have assumed in modern international law,
have tainted Western liberal origins; the West embodies a particular
legal tradition premised on a stridently individualistic account of
moral personality; and the ―universal‖ rights asserted by powerful
states such as the United States are thus merely another form of
Western imperialism universalizing the tenets of a distinct tradition
or ―being illiberal about being liberal, forcing people to be free.‖1
Such arguments challenging the claims to universality of international human rights law raise difficult questions. They are
questions, however, that urgently demand our intellectual and
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1. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN
LAW 266 (3d ed. 2007). See also Bhikhu Parekh, The Cultural Particularity of Liberal
Democracy, 40 POL. STUD. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 160 (1992).
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practical engagement rather than arrogant dismissal. David Kennedy,
for example, points to the fact that the idea of human rights has a
particular time and place of origin ―[p]ost-enlightenment, rationalist, secular, Western, modern, capitalist‖ and has therefore argued
that, to the extent the international human rights project is linked to
liberal Western ideas about the relationship among law, politics, and
economics, it is itself ―part of the problem.‖2
For Kennedy, the main difficulty is the way that human rights
positions itself, in accordance with its rationalistic underpinnings, as
an ―emancipatory political project‖ that operates outside politics.
The implicit logic is that:
emancipation means progress forward from the natural
passions of politics into the civilized reason of law. The
urgent need to develop a more vigorous human politics is
sidelined . . . . [and w]ork to develop law comes to be seen as
an emancipatory end in itself, leaving the human rights
movement too ready to articulate problems in political terms
and solutions in legal terms. Precisely the reverse would be
more useful.3
Similarly, for Martti Koskenniemi the paradox of international
human rights law is that it ―aims to create space for a non-political
normativity in the form of human rights that would be opposable to
the politics of states but is undermined by the experience that what
rights mean . . . and how they are applied, can only be determined by
the politics of states.‖4 This is the basis for Koskenniemi‘s thesis of
the interminable dialectic between the universal and the particular in
international legal argument.
I have titled my reflective essay ―Who is the ‗Human‘ in Human
Rights?‖ By doing so, I wish to suggest that modern critiques, like
those of Kennedy and Koskenniemi, force us to confront at least two
conceptual puzzles in the field of human rights which go to the heart
of issues so pressing and controversial today: the claims of culture
and religion.

2. David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101, 114–15 (2002).
3. Id. at 115.
4. Martti Koskenniemi, Human Rights, Politics, and Love, 13 FINNISH Y.B. INT‘L L. 79,
79 (2002).
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SECULAR FREEDOM AND THE CLAIMS OF RELIGION
The first puzzle concerns the two concepts, often run together, of
the secular (or secularism)5 and freedom, and the related question of
how rights—e.g. the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion—mediate between these purportedly universal or objective
positions and the imagined subjective claims of particular religious or
cultural norms.
Let me provide two contemporary examples.
The wearing of the Islamic headscarf in public schools, and the
rights of Muslim minorities in European nation-states more
generally,6 have been subjects of acute and often angry debate in
recent years. In particular France, with its own unique conceptions of
laicité and individual rights, has sought to restrict the wearing of
religious symbols in parts of the public sphere on various grounds
including those of public order, the rights and freedoms of others, and
gender equality or the protection of women, especially girls, against
discrimination.
The other striking example of contestation and conflict within
rights discourse has occurred in the context of the so-called
Muhammad cartoons affair. In September 2005, the Danish
newspaper Jyllands-Posten published twelve editorial cartoons
depicting the Islamic prophet Muhammad, leading to widespread and
violent protests both in Denmark and across the Islamic world.
In the United States, the weight of legal opinion has favored free
speech as against any countervailing right to freedom of religion, and
has favored the individual right to expression as against any
countervailing group or minority rights to be free from discrimination, hostility or violence. In Europe, however, there has generally
5. The notion of ―the secular‖ as an epistemic category and ―secularism‖ as a political
doctrine is discussed in TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM,
MODERNITY 1 (2003). Scholars such as T. N. Madan similarly distinguish between
―secularization‖ as a socio-cultural process that enlarges the ―areas of life—material,
institutional and intellectual—in which the role of the sacred is progressively limited;‖
―secularity‖ as the ―resultant state of social being;‖ and ―secularism‖ as an ideology that
argues the ―historical inevitability and progressive nature of secularization everywhere.‖ T.
N. MADAN, MODERN MYTHS, LOCKED MINDS: SECULARISM AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN INDIA
5–6 (1997).
6. See, e.g., Karima Bennoune, Secularism and Human Rights: A Contextual Analysis of
Headscarves, Religious Expression, and Women’s Equality Under International Law, 45
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 367 (2007); Peter G. Danchin, Suspect Symbols: Value Pluralism
as a Theory of Religious Freedom in International Law, 33 YALE J. INT‘L L. 1 (2008).
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been a greater sensitivity shown to these countervailing factors.
European states have made a genuine (albeit inconclusive) attempt to
reconcile the competing claims of right at issue in terms of both the
historical context of European inter-group relations and the relevant
international human rights instruments.
By contrast, in the vast majority of Islamic states there has been a
consensus that the cartoons are part of a wider pattern of
discrimination and hostility towards Muslims in Europe in particular
and are defamatory of Islam in general. On the basis that defamation
of religions is inconsistent with the right to freedom of expression,
the Organization of the Islamic Conference has called for ―legallybinding‖ U.N. resolutions to ―prevent defamation of religion and
prophets‖ and to ―render all acts whatsoever defaming Islam as
‗offensive acts‘ and subject to punishment.‖7
I should make clear that the eclectic, value-pluralist nature of the
European position is the approach I favor. By considering both the
individual and collective interests protected by the right to freedom
of religion, we begin to see both the unarticulated major premises and
particulars masquerading as universals in much Western rights
discourse.
But irrespective of how such a case is resolved in particular
domestic legal systems, how should it be addressed as a matter of
international human rights law? Does the communicative act at issue
here—or perhaps the failure of a state to prevent or punish such an
act—violate human rights norms regarding freedom of religion and
belief, or is it rather an act protected by rights such as freedom of
expression and opinion? Similarly, in the case of the wearing of the
Islamic headscarf, on what possible grounds may states limit the
freedom to manifest one‘s religion or belief? What, in particular,
would we need to know in order to make such determinations, and
why has there been such a wide divergence of views on these issues
across the world?

7. Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, 33d Sess., On Eliminating Hatred and
Prejudice Against Islam, Res. No. 26/33-DW (June 19–21, 2006). Note that fifty-seven
member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference have had longstanding
concerns regarding ―defamation of religions.‖ The U.N. Commission on Human Rights has
passed resolutions annually since 1999 on combating defamation of religions. See U.N.
Comm‘n on Hum. Rts., Combating Defamation of Religions, pmbl., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/
2005/3 (Apr. 12, 2005).
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In the language of Article 1 of the Universal Declaration, how
should human beings ―born free and equal in dignity and rights. . . .
endowed with the faculties of reason and conscience‖ and seeking to
―act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood‖ resolve such
seemingly intractable and historically and culturally situated conflicts? How do we understand the relationship in Article 1 between
the human as subject and the concepts of reason, conscience, and
freedom? Are ―conscience‖ and ―reason‖ perhaps the two ascending
and descending argumentative positions8 captured in our singular
notion of ―right‖—a notion which itself straddles between the Human
and a transcendent or metaphysical notion of (universal) Liberty? If
so, how does this argumentative structure differ in fundamental terms
from pre-classical international legal thought which was premised on
similar notions of God or Nature?
If the drafters of the Declaration—whether René Cassin, John
Humphrey or the Harvard-educated Peng-chun Chang9—had an
Enlightenment view of human rights as ―somehow located in human
beings simply by virtue of their own humanity, and for no other
extraneous reason, such as social conventions [whether religion,
tradition, or custom], acts of governments, or decisions of parliaments or courts,‖10 what does this tell us today, sixty years later?
Here I am alluding to Koskenniemi‘s point that, unlike lawyers
such as Hersch Lauterpacht who wrote his 1950 monograph
8. For the notion of ―ascending‖ and ―descending‖ strands of argument, see MARTTI
KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ARGUMENT 45 (1989).
9. JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS,
DRAFTING, AND INTENT 281 (1999). Note that there was great disagreement during the
drafting of Article 1 between the delegates of different States over what Morsink terms the
question of ―a single, transcendent source of value‖ leading to ―A Bargain about God and
Nature,‖ id. at 283, which, according to Cassin, ―allowed the Committee to take no position
on the nature of man and of society and to avoid metaphysical controversies, notably the
conflicting doctrines of spiritualists, rationalists, and materialists regarding the origin of the
rights of man,‖ id. at 287 (quoting René Cassin, Historique de la Déclaration Universelle de
1948, in LA PENSÉE ET L‘ACTION 108 (1981)). Lindholm has also observed that Article 1 in
no way explains the source of these universal characteristics of human beings. By omitting
any reference to a Supreme Being or Nature as a source of inherent rights, and thus leaving
open enough the space to allow for a multitude of interpretations, the drafters were able to
create a document which could be accepted by the broad majority of peoples. This, in turn,
supports the view that Article 1 is not a mere reiteration of Western Natural Rights
Philosophy. Tore Lindholm, Article 1, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
A COMMENTARY 31 (Asbjørn Eide et al. eds., 1992).
10. MORSINK, supra note 9, at 281.

11 DANCHIN (DO NOT DELETE)

104

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

4/29/2009 12:46 PM

[Vol. 24:99

International Law and Human Rights in an effort to ―recapture the
Western canon of individual rights as derived not only from
Enlightenment thinkers but also from sixteenth-century religious
humanism and even Stoic dogma,‖
we no longer take seriously the tradition within which human
rights grew up but ‗have fragmented an older tradition by
appropriating parts of it while leaving behind crucial premises
that gave these parts their underlying coherence.‘ As a result,
rights have become at best a sentimental memory of political
faith that we no longer have—a love that we have lost—but
cannot fit within the rituals of modern politics. At worst, they
have become a façade for cynicism, and an instrument of
hegemony.11
Without a universal foundation in ―human nature‖ or ―autonomous
human reason,‖ the quest for an ultimate foundation for human rights
is itself misconceived. On this, many today agree. 12 If rights cannot
in fact be outside politics or ideology—if we now see them not as a
condition or limit on politics in an objectively-ascertainable moral
order but in fact as an effect or outcome of politics—what implications follow for our understanding of the legal content and
institutional politics of human rights?
For Koskenniemi, the answer is to realize that rights defer to
politics in their practice and application in at least four ways: ―field
11. Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 80–81 (footnotes omitted). Koskenniemi suggests that
the tradition Lauterpacht was seeking to invoke and revive in the aftermath of World War II
and the Holocaust
received the meaning of human rights sometimes from scripture, sometimes from a
concept of uniform human nature, from a progressive philosophy of history or an
autonomous concept of reason. But today, naturalism, rationalism and religion have
each become vulnerable to the hermeneutics of suspicion embedded in the same
Enlightenment that gave us the notion of rights in the first place. The moral
grounding of rights that was central to Vitoria, Grotius or Locke is not available in a
world where morality has turned into subjective, historically conditioned ‗valuesystems‘ and where anthropologies of humanity have produced both liberal and
racist conclusions.
Id. at 81.
12. See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Human Rights Without Foundations (Univ. of Oxford Faculty
of Law, Working Paper No. 14/2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=999874 (advancing an antifoundational or ―political conception‖ of human
rights); JOHN GRAY, ENLIGHTENMENT‘S WAKE: POLITICS AND CULTURE AT THE CLOSE OF THE
MODERN AGE 72 (1995) (arguing that rights claims are never foundational because ―human
rights have neither substantive content nor moral weight until their impact on human
interests, their contribution to human well-being, has been specified‖).
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constitution‖ (the process by which different areas of social life come
to be characterized in terms of rights); ―indeterminacy‖ (rights have
no meaning independent of how they are interpreted by a relevant
authority in a relevant context); ―right-exception‖ (rights always
come with exceptions and the scope of the exceptions are determined
by choices which ultimately rely on alternative conceptions of good
society); and ―conflicts of rights‖ (in any conflict, the opposing sides
will describe their claims in terms of rights).13
None of this would have much surprised Max Horkheimer or
Theodor Adorno writing their Dialectic of Enlightenment in 1947 at
the exact moment the Declaration was being drafted and international
lawyers such as Lauterpacht were decrying the sovereignty of the
nation-state in the name of the ―sovereignty of man.‖ For Horkheimer and Adorno, the scientific method of the Enlightenment
may have originally intended to serve the ideals of human
liberation in an assault upon religious dogma. Yet the power
of scientific reason ultimately wound up being directed not
merely against the gods, but all metaphysical ideas—including
conscience and freedom—as well. ‗Knowledge‘ became
divorced from ‗information,‘ norms from facts, and the
scientific method, increasingly freed from any commitment to
liberation, transformed nature into an object of domination,
and itself into a whore employed by the highest bidder.14
In similarly controversial terms, Alasdair MacIntyre argues that the
Enlightenment project has failed in its objective to find a freestanding rational justification of liberal political morality.
On the one hand the individual moral agent, freed from
hierarchy and teleology, conceives of himself and is conceived
of by moral philosophers as sovereign in his moral authority.
On the other hand the inherited, if partially transformed rules
of morality have to be found some new status, deprived as they
have been of their older teleological character and their even
more ancient categorical character as expressions of an
13. Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 82–85.
14. Stephen Eric Bronner, Interpreting the Enlightenment: Metaphysics, Critique, and
Politics, 3 LOGOS (2004), http://www.logosjournal.com/issue_3.3/bronner.htm. Note also
Gray‘s argument that the core of the Enlightenment was the ―displacement of local,
customary or traditional moralities, and of all forms of transcendental faith, by a critical or
rational morality, which was projected as the basis of a universal civilization.‖ GRAY, supra
note 12, at 123.
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ultimately divine law.15
But did the drafters really hold to an essentialist view of the
foundations of human rights? Or rather, as Morsink has suggested,
did they hold to non-essentialist, non-rationalist views of both the
secular and freedom such that ―any criticism of the Enlightenment
project, as then conceived, does not automatically doom the
Universal Declaration‖?16
Here it is helpful to recall Charles Taylor‘s distinction between the
―common ground‖ and ―independent political ethic‖ strategies of
seeking to justify a universal norm of religious freedom, and, in turn,
the methodological implications of seeking to reconcile these two
modes of justification.
Each strategy offers different ways of conceptualizing the bases
upon which people of different religious and fundamental commitments seek to live together in a political community. On the one
hand, the common ground approach seeks convergence on certain
norms by appealing to different comprehensive (religious or other)
commitments. On the other hand, the independent political ethic
approach ―asks us to abstract from these deeper or higher beliefs
altogether for purposes of political morality‖ in search of a common
basis for peaceful and equitable coexistence.
The important point to note is that neither strategy on its own can
be successful because neither rests upon a firm foundation. As
Taylor notes, the main problem with the common ground approach is
that in diverse societies with expanding religious and fundamental
commitments, ―the ground originally defined as common becomes
that of one party among others.‖17 Given that competing conceptions
15. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 60 (3d ed.
2007). For Gray, this collapse gives ―contemporary moral discourse its distinctive character
of emotivism or subjectivism, in which moral judgments are in the end assimilated to
preferences, and of deep incoherence.‖ GRAY, supra note 12, at 148. It is merely the ―long
shadow cast in the slow eclipse of Christian transcendental faith‖ with the result that we
today live ―among the fragments of archaic moral vocabularies, whose undergirding
structure of metaphysical and religious beliefs has long since collapsed.‖ Id.
16. MORSINK, supra note 9, at 283. Morsink suggests that they saw the two human
capacities of reason and conscience as ―epistemic‖ vehicles by which we can come to know
that people have human rights. Id.
17. Charles Taylor, Modes of Secularism, in SECULARISM AND ITS CRITICS 35–36 (Rajeev
Bhargava ed., 1998) (noting that while the Founders of the U.S. Constitution agreed on
―some kind of Christian outlook‖ that could be ―pushed laterally into a vaguer biblical
theism to accommodate Jews,‖ the U.S. ―now contains substantial numbers of non-believers,
as well as Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and adherents of many other views‖).
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of the good themselves generate the Rawlsian overlapping consensus,
that consensus is dynamic, intersubjective, and constantly shifting,
and can thus have no single, stable foundation.
Likewise, the ―very diversification that has undercut the common
ground approach also challenges the independent ethic,‖ a process
that becomes especially difficult as between believers of all faiths on
the one hand and atheists on the other—who seek to ―police the
boundary between independent and religious ethic more closely, and
to . . . push further the process of making religion irrelevant in the
public sphere.‖18
Not only is the meaning of the right to religious freedom itself
essentially contested between the religious and secular spheres, but
also its relationship to other conceptions of rights (such as minority
and self-determination norms) is equally contested. For these and
related reasons, the problem of rights foundationalism is irresolvable
when both strategies are considered separately.
Taylor suggests that these shortcomings become even more
problematic when religious freedom is asserted as a right under
international law. Viewed from a non-Western perspective, both
approaches appear inextricably linked to their Christian origins: the
common ground to a form of post-Enlightenment Deism and the
independent ethic to the rise of Western unbelief and secularism. To
the extent, then, that international human rights law is perceived as
being grounded in either (or both) of these approaches, the dual
charges of foreign and imperial imposition are likely to arise. Indeed,
perhaps somewhat ironically, this problem is likely to be more acute
in the case of the independent ethic which, once unmoored from
Western secularism and imported into comprehensively religious
societies, ―understandably comes across as the imposition of one
metaphysical view over others, and an alien one at that.‖19
18. Id. at 36. Taylor sees this as leading to a ―Kulturkampf, in which ‗secularists‘ slug it
out with believers on issues about the fundamentals of their society.‖ Id. To believers this
may soon be perceived as the exclusion of religion in the name of a ―rival metaphysical
belief.‖ Id. The problem becomes further compounded when ―the society diversifies to
contain substantial numbers of adherents of non-Judeo-Christian religions. If even some
Christians find the ‗post-Christian‘ independent ethic partisan, how much harder will
Muslims find it to swallow it.‖ Id. at 36–37.
19. Id. at 37. Taylor suggests that in this form, ―Western secularism may not ‗travel‘
very well outside its heartland; or only in the form of an authoritarian programme designed
to diminish the hold of religion on the masses, as in Turkey under Atatürk, or China under
Mao.‖ Id.
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Conversely, the common ground approach is only vulnerable to
one of these charges—that of its historically Christian lineage. For
Taylor, there is no reason, at the level of theory, why the logic of this
approach could not be applied and readapted in other non-Christian,
non-Western contexts. Of course, such a project would still face
major difficulties on account of the diversification of religious and
metaphysical beliefs in increasingly pluralistic societies. But it is this
possibility, all the same, that has led contemporary rights theorists to
seek to define a third approach, one that avoids both the historical
and conceptual shortcomings of the former two strategies.
This third and more recent strategy seeks to apply the insights of
philosophical hermeneutics to Rawl‘s idea of overlapping consensus.
In asking what it would mean to come to a ―genuine, unforced international consensus on human rights,‖ Taylor has suggested this
would require that
different groups, countries, religious communities, and civilizations, although holding incompatible fundamental views on
theology, metaphysics, human nature, and so on, would come
to an agreement on certain norms that ought to govern human
behavior. Each would have its own way of justifying this from
out of its profound background conception. We would agree
on the norms while disagreeing on why they were the right
norms, and we would be content to live in this consensus,
undisturbed by the differences of profound underlying belief.20
The strength of this approach is that it avoids the need for
agreement on a commonly held ―foundation.‖ As we have seen, the
common ground approach founders in its search for shared religious
bases for norms regulating the public sphere in a world of diverse
states and societies. Once beyond the relatively homogenous discourse of Judeo-Christian constitutionalism, even some form of postEnlightenment Deism is unlikely to be accepted in societies based on
Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism, or Confucianism (or indeed certain
nonreligious comprehensive ideologies such as Communism).
It is for this reason that the independent political ethic appears to
offer the only viable alternative. The problem is that universal
acceptance of any independent ethic—conceived in purely secular,
20. Charles Taylor, Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights, in THE
EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 124, 124 (Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell
eds., 1999).
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―political‖ terms—must also involve the acceptance by diverse
societies of its conceptual foundations. But as we have seen, from
any comprehensive perspective such deontological assertions of
objectivity and universality are likely to be contested as deriving
from competing, ―secular‖ metaphysical philosophies.
The hermeneutic approach is able to overcome these various
difficulties by accepting from the outset the impossibility of any
universally agreed foundation—whether as a product of religiouslyinspired convergence or deontological deduction—for those principles or norms sought to govern the political sphere. It accepts that
those who adhere to such a norm ―will have some broader and deeper
understanding of the good in which it is embedded‖ and it thus aims
to ―respect the diversity of such understandings, while building
consensus on the ethic.‖21
Such a paradigm shift, if genuinely and inclusively pursued, has
significant implications not only for the scope and content of human
rights norms but also for their philosophical background justifications
and the legal forms in which they are expressed and given force. As
Taylor states:
To be accepted in any given society, these would in each case
have to repose on some widely acknowledged philosophical
justification, and to be enforced, they would have to find
expression in legal mechanisms. One way of putting our
central question might be this: What variations can we imagine
in philosophical justifications or in legal forms that would still
be compatible with a meaningful universal consensus on what
really matters to us, the enforceable norms?22
On this basis, Taylor posits a threefold distinction between norms,
legal forms, and background justifications, and argues that such
norms have to be ―distinguished and analytically separated not just
from the background justifications, but also from the legal forms that
give them force.‖23

21. Taylor, supra note 17, at 38.
22. Taylor, supra note 20, at 129.
23. Id. at 143.

11 DANCHIN (DO NOT DELETE)

110

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

4/29/2009 12:46 PM

[Vol. 24:99

EQUALITY AND THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE
Let me turn now to the second puzzle in human rights theory: the
question of what we mean by ―human equality‖ and how this idea
relates to deeply-situated issues of collective identity and culture.
Consider again laws proscribing the wearing of religious symbols
in certain parts of the public sphere. Under traditional liberal rights
approaches, the controversy over the wearing of the Islamic headscarf
appears inexplicable. As Anna Galeotti states:
The naive liberal view conceives of toleration as the principle
according to which everyone should be free to follow his or
her ideals and style of life as long as no harm is done to
anyone else. Headscarves do no harm to any third party, and
the choice to wear one for whatever reason rests in the proper
domain of personal freedom. This simplistic approach to the
case suggests that toleration is the obvious solution, but, in
doing so, it disguises the raison d’être of the controversy.24
But viewing this issue solely in terms of individual rights (i.e.,
individuals are free to practice their religion provided the practice
does not cause harm to others) obscures the collective religious and
cultural implications of symbols such as the Islamic headscarf.
Members of different national, cultural, and religious groups have
differing national, cultural, and religious identities—that is to say,
collective identities—which must be carefully factored into
interpreting or analyzing rights claims of this kind. Indeed, what
gives rise to conflicts between differently-situated subjects are not
primarily differences between individuals, but differences—and
unequal treatment—between groups.
Before proceeding, it is important to note that the Universal
Declaration says very little about so-called ―collective rights.‖
Emerging from the ashes of the Second World War was a general
consensus amongst the main powers in the early 1940s to replace the
minority protection treaties of the inter-war period with a human
rights regime more directly centered on individual rights. The
prevailing sentiment in 1943 was captured by Under Secretary of
State Sumner Welles, when he stated that:
in the kind of world for which we fight, there must cease to
24. ANNA ELISABETTA GALEOTTI, TOLERATION AS RECOGNITION 118 (2002).
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exist any need for the use of that accursed term ―racial or
religious minority‖ . . . [I]s it conceivable that the peoples of
the United Nations can consent to the reestablishment of any
system where human beings will still be regarded as belonging
to such ―minorities‖?25
Accordingly, neither the U.N. Charter nor the Universal
Declaration contains any group or minority rights provisions, and
both are premised instead on the nondiscrimination principle.26 Part
of the reason for this was the decisive influence of the Western
powers in drafting the Declaration, especially the United States. In
the Third Session of the Human Rights Commission, for example,
Eleanor Roosevelt argued that ―provisions relating to rights of
minorities had no place in a declaration of human rights,‖ largely on
the basis that ―minority questions did not exist on the American
continent.‖27 It was only later, when the process began of transforming the Declaration into the legally binding International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), that certain collective rights were (re)introduced into international human rights law. In
particular, Article 1, protecting a people‘s right to self-determination,
and Article 27, protecting the rights of ethnic, religious, and linguistic
minorities, are today accepted international legal norms. The
inclusion of self-determination in both covenants,28 coupled with
Article 27 in the ICCPR, thus reflect recognition of the limitations of
25. Joel E. Oestreich, Liberal Theory and Minority Group Rights, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 108,
113 (1999) (quoting Sumner Welles, Address by the Under Secretary of State (June 5, 1943),
in 8 DEPT. ST. BULL. 479, 482) (alteration in original).
26. See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A (III), art. 2(1), U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; see also
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), (26), Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
27. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Hum. Rts. Comm‘n, 3d Sess., 73d plen. mtg.
at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.73 (June 24, 1948). In the previous year, Eleanor Roosevelt
made the point that while there were different ethnic and linguistic groups in the U.S., their
rights were adequately secured on the basis of individual rights and the nondiscrimination
principle. See also U.N. ECOSOC, Hum. Rts. Comm‘n, Report of the Working Group on
the Declaration on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/57 (Dec. 10, 1947). For a striking
account of this period in American foreign policy, see CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE
PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
1944–1955 (2003) (pointing to the ―exigencies of the Cold War‖ and the need to camouflage
the ―the reality of Jim Crow democracy‖ and the ―Colored question‖ as shaping the U.S.
drafting positions).
28. The right to self-determination is articulated in Article 1 common to both the ICCPR,
supra note 26, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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the nondiscrimination principle and the need to protect the rights of
minority groups and indigenous peoples—not just their physical
existence but also their right to a distinct collective identity.29
Scholars of international human rights law are beginning to
recognize how the divergent claims and interests of majorities and
minorities, and the different conceptions of individual and collective
goods from which they arise, are inseparably related to individual
claims of right. Correspondingly, it is becoming apparent that the
―liberal algebra‖30 of rights regimes is unable to resolve such conflicts
without considering, at least at some point in the analysis, different
conceptions of collective goods in the historical context of particular
political communities.
In order to illustrate the importance of the collective aspects of
claims to religious freedom, we need to squarely confront a generally
under-theorized and contested area of international human rights law
known broadly as ―group rights.‖ In particular, we need to consider
two types of communal claims—the first of so-called ―peoples‖ or
―nations,‖ and the second of so-called ―religious, cultural or linguistic
minorities.‖
Together these group claims point toward the need for a theory of
value pluralism in international law (whether ―liberal‖ or otherwise)
and away from classical liberal theories premised exclusively on the

29. Given these post-1948 developments, Morsink has asked whether an additional
provision modeled on Article 27 of the ICCPR should be added to the Declaration today.
MORSINK, supra note 9. This would, in his view, correct the ―greatest defect of this pivotal
document,‖ i.e., the blindness it shares with the U.N. Charter about the connection that exists
between the prevention of discrimination and the protection of minorities. See id. at 286–
287. See also PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES
141–143 (1991) (suggesting that Article 27 is the ―only expression of the right to an identity
in modern human rights conventions intended for universal application‖).
30. For Waldron, the liberal algebra of rights seeks to secure public order in a way that is
fair to the aims and activities of all. The aim is Kantian in inspiration: ―Act externally in
such a way that the free use of your will is compatible with the freedom of everyone
according to a universal law.‖ Jeremy Waldron, Toleration and Reasonableness, in THE
CULTURE OF TOLERATION IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES: REASONABLE TOLERANCE 13 (Catriona
McKinnon & Dario Castiglione eds., 2003). On this basis
the liberal claim ―may be described as the task of specifying a set of constraints on
conduct (call it set C), satisfying two conditions: (1) no two actions permitted by C
conflict with one another; and (2) for each individual who is subject to C, the range
of actions permitted by C is adequate for the pursuit of his ends. I shall call these
the requirements of compossibility and adequacy. Together they amount to
something like algebraic specifications for the formal structure of a liberal society.
Id. at 14–15.
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idea of individual rights. Indeed, it is only by including in the
analysis these two sets of group rights (self-determination and
minority rights) and considering their conceptual interrelationship to
individual rights that the issue of the wearing of religious symbols or
attire becomes comprehensible, and the need to move beyond
traditional liberal accounts of human rights becomes apparent. On
this basis, the need to accord public recognition of group differences
and identities requires us to reconsider two central tenets of the
liberal rights tradition: first, the idea that comprehensive conceptions
of religious and moral value are ―private‖ matters to be excluded
from the public sphere; and second, the idea that religious freedom
requires no more than noninterference with the individual‘s imagined
sphere of liberty, as opposed to public recognition of a plurality of
different religious and cultural groups and ways of life.
Taylor refers to the Western concern for equality in the form of
nondiscrimination—which he notes is a relatively recent addition to
the Western philosophical tradition of rights and judicial review—to
illustrate these points. This norm can be traced to the rise of the idea
of Natural Right, its supplanting of subjective rights in medieval
systems of law, and the decline of the view that human beings are
embedded in a meaningful cosmic order against which ―various
forms of human differentiation could appear natural, unchallengeable—be they social, racial, or sexual.‖31 Taylor thus argues that:
The destruction of this order has allowed for a process of
unmasking existing social and gender differences as merely
socially constructed, as without basis in the nature of things, as
revocable and hence ultimately without justification. The
process of working this out has been long, and we are not yet
at the end, but it has been hard to resist in Western civilization
in the last two centuries.
This aspect of Western rights talk is often very hard to
export because it encounters societies in which certain social
differences are still considered very meaningful, and they are
seen in turn as intrinsically linked to certain practices that in
Western societies are now regarded as discriminatory.32
What this suggests is not that equality and nondiscrimination
norms should be rejected under the banner of cultural relativism, but
31. Taylor, supra note 20, at 139.
32. Id.
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rather that uniquely Western conceptions of these norms, including
the extent to which such conceptions have become entrenched in
international law, need constantly to be open to challenge and
reformation in such a way as to allow for the contribution of nonWestern conceptions of the same ideas.
Questions of gender equality raised in cases such as Shah Bano33 in
India or the issue of recognition of Muslim marriages in South
Africa,34 for example, give rise to conflicts between contested ideas
of equality and difference. The demand of the Muslim community in
India for an autonomy regime and legal recognition of religious and
other ―personal‖ laws is a demand against the Indian state for
substantive equality on the basis of religion or belief. In Shah Bano,
a conflict arose between a Muslim personal law requiring the return
of the marriage settlement upon divorce and the payment of
maintenance only for the period of iddat, and the Indian Code of
Criminal Procedure requiring monthly maintenance in specified
situations of need. In this case, we face a genuine conflict not
between a liberty claim on the one hand and an equality claim on the
other, but between two competing conceptions of equality. One
conception of equality protects India‘s Muslim minority against other
majority and minority groups and the other protects the equal rights
of women in India regardless of religion. We should be careful not to
recognize automatically or privilege only the second substantive
equality claim and not the first. And if both claims are to be given
their due, how are the conflicts between them to be resolved?35
One possibility is for the State to exercise its overriding legislative
power, what Robert Cover once called the state‘s ―jurispathic‖ mode
of coercively suppressing the ―fecundity of the jurisgenerative principle‖ through the domination of autonomous communities under a
unitary law.36 But if so, what principle should the state employ?
Most human rights proponents will argue that the state ought to
privilege whatever is best for women according to some conception
of liberal substantive rights. But what is this conception of equality
exactly, and who is to decide both its substantive meaning and its
scope of application? Does it entail the version of maintenance upon
33. Mohammed Ahmed Khan vs. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 3 S.C.R. 844 (India).
34. See infra, note 40 and accompanying text.
35. See Danchin, supra note 6, at 58.
36. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15–16 (1983).
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divorce currently seen as meeting the demands of substantive gender
equality in, say, France, or Australia, or perhaps Brazil? Or is it
rather the latest account advanced by Catherine MacKinnon or
Abdullahi An-Na‘im? And how exactly is any such account to be
squared with the Indian Constitution‘s commitment in Articles 26
through 28 to guarantee the communal autonomy of India‘s religious
minorities?
We may also ask whether the ultimate goal sought under the twin
banners of ―secularism‖ (or ―equal individual rights‖) and ―gender
equality‖ is for religious personal law to disappear altogether and to
be replaced by a uniform civil code. Recall, for example, Susan
Moller Okin‘s striking statement in her essay Is Multiculturalism Bad
for Women?:
[It] is by no means clear, from a feminist point of view, that
minority group rights are ‗part of the solution‘ and in the case
of nonliberal minority groups in liberal states, ―female
members of the culture . . . might be much better off if the
culture into which they were born were either to become
extinct (so that its members would become integrated into the
less sexist surrounding culture) or, preferably, to be
encouraged to alter itself so as to reinforce the equality of
women—at least to the degree to which this value is upheld in
the majority culture.37
Is this the possibility of a ―final solution‖ of which Isaiah Berlin
once spoke—the prospect that mankind could be made just and happy
and creative and harmonious forever, for which ―no price [could be]
too high‖ to pay?38 If so, what exactly is the price to be paid, how is
it to be exacted, and what, if any, are the possible alternatives for the
future?
Ironically, in order for the state to be right in its codification of the
demands of substantive gender equality, it must ignore, or simply
override, the nuanced and contested internal arguments within
religious communities themselves. My argument is that there are
strong normative reasons why the state ought to exercise considerable

37. Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in IS MULTICULTURALISM
BAD FOR WOMEN? 7 (Martha C. Nussbaum et al. eds., 1999).
38. Isaiah Berlin, The Pursuit of the Ideal, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY:
CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 15 (Henry Hardy ed., 1991), cited in STEVEN LUKES,
LIBERALS AND CANNIBALS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF DIVERSITY 90 (2003).
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deference to the arguments going on there and that the struggle over
the status quo ought not to be decided solely by the state according to
what prevailing national majorities (recall the intolerant and
threatening role of the Hindu Right in the Shah Bano controversy) or
secular liberal academics, judges or bureaucrats decide.
Of course, how such claims are to be mediated is essentially
contested, but requires, at a minimum, an intersubjective and dialogic
understanding of rights discourse. A helpful illustration of this
dynamic is the current debate in South Africa over the recognition of
Muslim personal laws.39 After extensive consultations with Muslim
communities, the South African Law Reform Commission proposed,
in July 2003, a draft Muslim Marriages Act which inter alia
recognizes Muslim marriages (including polygynous marriages) and
deals with a myriad of issues from registration, to dissolution, to
custody of and access to minor children, and to issues of maintenance
(both spousal and child support). In response, the South African
Commission for Gender Equality drafted an alternative bill called the
Recognition of Religious Marriages Act, which is stated to be a
―secular bill of general application‖ and provides for the recognition
of all religious marriages (thus avoiding issues of codification of
specific religious doctrines).40
This is precisely the type of conflict which value pluralism both
anticipates and celebrates. In South Africa, we can thus see a robust
constitutional dispensation which provides the normative space for
contestation between what Ayelet Shachar has termed a ―religious
particularist‖ conception of pluralism, in which different religious
39. The legal recognition of shari’a law is today becoming a contested issue in a number
of Western states such as Canada where the Ontario Law Reform Commission is reviewing
whether Islamic principles of family and inheritance law could be used to resolve disputes
within the Muslim community in Canada. See Report from Marion Boyd to Michael Bryant,
Attorney General of Ontario, Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice,
Promoting Inclusion (Dec. 20, 2004), available at http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/
english/about/pubs/boyd (last visited Apr. 4, 2009). In England, the Archbishop of
Canterbury has recently observed that Muslim communities seek the freedom to live under
shari’a law and he has urged an exploration of what ―might be entailed in crafting a just and
constructive relationship between Islamic law and the statutory law of the United Kingdom.‖
Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, Civil and Religious Law in England: a
Religious Perspective, Lecture at the Royal Courts of Justice (Feb. 7, 2008), available at
http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1575 (last visited Mar. 28, 2009).
40. For a recent discussion of the tensions between these two bills, see Rashida Manjoo,
The Recognition of Muslim Personal Laws in South Africa: Implications for Women’s
Human Rights (Hum. Rts. Program at Harv. L. Sch, Project Report 2005-7, 2007), available
at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp/documents/Manjoo_RashidaWP.pdf.
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communities have legal power over issues of personal status, and a
―secular absolutist‖ conception, in which the state has authority over
family law matters and all citizens are subject to a uniform secular
family law. That this contestation will yield varying forms of legal
pluralism and accommodation while at the same time seeking to
maintain the existence of different majority and minority cultures
should not surprise us either descriptively or normatively.
These then are the difficult questions that confront us. They
involve normative conflicts which are also far from settled even in
the West (as Rawls‘s avoidance strategy of consigning questions of
discrimination on the basis of religion to the ―private sphere‖ in his
Political Liberalism amply shows). Thus:
we can readily understand that a certain way of framing the
difference, however oppressive it may be in practice, also
serves as the reference point for deeply felt human identities.
The rejection of the framework can be felt as the utter denial of
the basis of identity, and this not just for the favored gender,
but also for the oppressed one.41
Claims of equality and nondiscrimination—even in liberal
societies—raise difficult and complex questions in their relationship
to religion and culture. If the plurality of conflicting values is to be
mutually respected, rather than uncritically dominated by one value,
conflicts between equality norms and collective identities must be
interpreted and inter-subjectively discussed in continuity with each
society‘s historic traditions and reference points. Indeed, it is now
well recognized that ―fundamentalist‖ resistance to the redefinition of
cultural and religious forms correlates with the extent to which
outside portrayals or attempts to influence a tradition are made in
condemnatory or contemptuous terms.42
On this basis, scholars such as Abdullahi An-Na‘im advocate the
logic of the heremeneutic approach in relation to the application of
human rights norms in non-Western contexts. This requires the
development of a ―coherent and comprehensive methodology of
internal cultural discourse that is capable of challenging prevailing
conceptions of indigenous culture in favor of the proposed human
41. Taylor, supra note 20, at 139.
42. As Taylor observes, this is a ―self-reinforcing dynamic, in which perceived external
condemnation helps to feed extreme reaction, which calls down further condemnation, and
hence further reaction, in a vicious spiral.‖ Id. at 140.
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rights norm.‖43 This can be illustrated by considering the principle of
equality in the context of the Islamic legal tradition where, from the
perspective of international human rights law, shari’a law is regarded
as discriminating against women and non-Muslim minorities.
Distinctions in shari’a based on certain historical and cultural
understandings of the natural or divine order of things run up against
the uncompromising demands of human rights standards for the
formal equality of all human beings. Tabandeh, for example, has
argued that Islam cannot accept certain aspects of Article 2 of the
Universal Declaration (prohibiting discrimination on any ground),
―for it cannot deny the difference between Muslim and nonMuslim.‖44 Similarly, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in
Islam provides that ―[w]oman is equal to man in human dignity,‖
while making no reference to equality in rights.45
Western scholars of Islam and human rights such as Ann Elizabeth
Mayer regard such sharia-based distinctions as clear violations of
international human rights standards.46 But Mayer fails to consider
on what basis rights such as Article 7 of the Universal Declaration,
which establishes the principle of formal equality and equal
protection of the law,47 should properly be regarded as universal.
43. Abdullahi A. An-Na‘im, The Cultural Mediation of Human Rights: The Al-Arqam
Case in Malasia, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 147,
156. An-Na‘im suggests that ―all cultures have a certain degree of ambivalence that allows
for contesting prevailing perceptions and seeking to replace them with new or formerly
suppressed conceptions through an internal discourse within the terms of reference of the
particular culture and in accordance with its own criteria of legitimacy.‖ Id. at 159. See also
ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA‘IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW chs. 3, 7 (1990) (arguing for acceptance of the
concept and content of a human rights regime through internal cultural legitimation in an
Islamic context).
44. SULTAN HUSSEIN TABANDEH OF GUNABAD, A MUSLIM COMMENTARY ON THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 20 (F. J. Goulding trans., 1970).
45. 19th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, July 31–Aug. 5, 1990, Cairo
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, art. 6, reprinted in RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
BASIC DOCUMENTS 185, 186 (Tad Stahnke & J. Paul Martin eds., 1998). See also UDHR,
supra note 26, art. 1(a) (providing, in part, that ―[a]ll men are equal in terms of basic human
dignity and basic obligations and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the grounds
of race, colour, language, sex, religious belief, political affiliation, social status or other
considerations‖ (emphasis added)).
46. ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND POLITICS 83–96
(3d ed. 1999) (examining Islamic law, especially pertaining to discrimination against women
and non-Muslim minorities, in terms of international human rights standards).
47. Art. 7 of the UDHR, supra note 26, provides in full that: ―All are equal before the
law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are
entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and
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Indeed, Mayer‘s analysis of Article 7, in terms of the equal protection
clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, is
revealing:
Although many features of U.S. equal protection jurisprudence
necessarily reflect the peculiarities of U.S. history and the
social environment, the basic concept has been emulated in
other laws, and the idea of equal protection of the law is
endorsed in international law. . . .
One sees in Article 7 of the [Universal Declaration of
Human Rights] unequivocal endorsement of the idea that
equal, nondiscriminatory treatment under the law is due all
persons. According to Article 2 of the UDHR, it is impermissible to discriminate based on sex or religion, race, color,
language, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, or birth or other status. Any legal measures that
discriminate among groups of people using these criteria
violate the UDHR guarantee of equality and equal protection.
Thus, both the U.S. constitutional principle and its UDHR
counterpart envisage equal protection under a neutral law, a
law that does not deny freedoms or rights to members of
weaker or disfavored categories of society and that accords all
people equal treatment.48
The historical and conceptual linkages between Anglo-American
and prevailing international conceptions of the nondiscrimination
norm here are laid bare. While Mayer acknowledges the particular
historical context in which the U.S. equal protection clause arose in
the aftermath of the Civil War and efforts to end apartheid against
blacks in the South,49 she uncritically accepts its subsequent elevation
to the status of international law.
The result of this elision for human rights discourse has had two
interrelated distorting effects. On the one hand, to the extent that
religious and cultural forms are embedded in the (public) laws and
practices of non-Western states, any attempt to justify these norms
against any incitement to such discrimination.‖
48. MAYER, supra note 46, at 88–89 (emphasis added).
49. Mayer cites Jacobus tenBroek, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1951). Note that Taylor similarly traces the rise of equal protection and
nondiscrimination as central subjects of judicial review in the Anglo-American world to the
Fourteenth Amendment. CHARLES TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALISM AND ―THE POLITICS OF
RECOGNITION‖ 54–56 (Amy Gutmann et al eds., 1992).
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against the international legal norms of equality and nondiscrimination has been axiomatically viewed as constituting a disreputable
form of cultural relativism justifying patriarchal and pre-modern
hierarchies and power relations.
While in many instances this may well be the case, there has been
a serious failure to understand that the conception of toleration used
for making such judgments presumes a compromise in the form of an
historically and culturally particular view of toleration which itself
remains in force in virtually all liberal states. This view springs from
the classic liberal idea of a public-private divide which not so much
resolves questions of inequality and unequal treatment on religious
and cultural grounds as avoids or suppresses them.
In failing to see universal demands of equality and nondiscrimination in the public sphere as embodying the unconscious
prejudices of a particular tradition, a ―single, rigid and dogmatic
horizon of individual freedom,‖50 such an approach forecloses the
possibility of any fusion of horizons with other conceptions—ones
that may well contain admirable and valuable insights and other
forms of accommodation.
We see this dynamic most obviously in the well-trodden debate
over claims of equality and diversity in contemporary political
theory. For instance, Brian Barry‘s Culture and Equality provides a
recent example of a liberal theorist clinging rigidly to interpretive
method with no apparent conception of the prejudices underlying his
―objective‖ theory of egalitarian liberalism.51 In reply, James Tully
has argued that there are at least three ways in which Barry‘s
approach forecloses any genuine dialogue on the ―irreducible and
interrelated problems of equality and culture,‖ and thus of any
possible fusion of horizons.52
First, Barry employs ―Enlightenment blackmail‖ by dismissing any
opposing arguments as advancing or deriving from anti-Enlightenment essentialist conceptions of culture. In fact, however, the
dialogic concept of culture at the heart of philosophical hermeneutics
50. See Peter G. Danchin, Of Prophets and Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and the
Conflict of Rights in International Law, 49 HARV. L.J. 249, 321 (2008).
51. BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF MULTICULTURISM (2001).
52. James Tully, The Illiberal Liberal: Brian Barry’s Polemical Attack on Multiculturalism, in MULTICULTURALISM RECONSIDERED: CULTURE AND EQUALITY AND ITS CRITICS 102,
102–13 (Paul Kelly ed., 2002).
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is quite the reverse: not ―separate, bounded and internally uniform,‖
but rather ―overlapping, interactive and internally negotiated.‖53
Second, Barry seeks to contrast and polarize anti-Enlightenment
particularism and relativism with Enlightenment universalism and
non-relativism. This is achieved in two ways:
(i) by taking formal equality (sameness of treatment) as the
standing norm against which any claim for recognition must
advance compelling reasons to gain an exception rather than
attempting to ―work out what a liberal commitment to equality
(of opportunity and respect) means in today‘s conditions of
cultural diversity;‖ and
(ii) by mistaking universal rights and their means of recognition and accommodation with the non-universal features
these rights protect.54
By contrast, contemporary theorists of difference, such as Will
Kymlicka and Joseph Carens (who Barry bitterly criticizes), have
sought to defend notions of community and culture from within the
liberal tradition itself by advancing accounts of minority rights that
seek to balance individual autonomy and the limits of toleration in
multicultural modern societies.55 In similar terms, Rawls‘s shift from
A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism (also attacked by Barry) is
a further example of a liberal theorist struggling to deal with the
implications of religious and cultural diversity in a democratic
society.
Finally, Barry ignores the ―democratic dimension‖ of multiculturalism whereby citizens exchange (ethical) reasons over claims
for public recognition and accommodation of suppressed cultural
differences.56 This is based on a critical distinction between
53. Id. at 104. Tully‘s argument that these features of cultures allow for their continuous
renegotiation and transformation by their members is set out more fully in JAMES TULLY,
STRANGE MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY (1995).
54. Tully, supra note 52, at 105–106.
55. See especially WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE (1989);
WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS
(1995); THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995); see also JOSEPH H.
CARENS, CULTURE, CITIZENSHIP, AND COMMUNITY: A CONTEXTUAL EXPLORATION OF JUSTICE
AS EVENHANDEDNESS (2000).
56. Tully, supra note 52, at 108. This has four features: (1) the Enlightenment ideal that
laws should rest on the agreement of the people through the free exchange of public reasons;
(2) the exchange of reasons over a contested rule of recognition takes place in accordance
with universal principles of reciprocity; (3) while the ―internal reasons‖ that members of a
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―internal‖ moral reasons and ―external‖ ethical reasons, the latter—
though drawing on aspects of a person‘s or group‘s particular
practical identity—being both ―general‖ and ―public.‖ By being
closed and unwilling to discover and revise the unreflective partiality
in his own particular interpretation of freedom and equality (which,
after all, is ―universal and culture-free‖), Barry has no need for any
modus vivendi ethos of toleration and peaceful coexistence.57
On the other hand, to the extent that religious traditions themselves
(independent of any state laws and practices) are the source of
unequal and discriminatory treatment, the public-private distinction
has operated in liberal theory—under the banner of ―freedom of
religion‖—to shield religions in toto from the claims of the equality
norm. Scholars of women‘s rights in the areas of culture and religion
such as Madhavi Sunder have termed this the ―new sovereignty,‖ the
deference of human rights law to religious despotism in the private
sphere through the definition of religion as a ―sovereign, extralegal
jurisdiction in which inequality is not only accepted, but expected.‖
She states: ―Law views religion as natural, irrational, incontestable,
and imposed—in contrast to the public sphere, the only viable space
for freedom and reason. Simply put, religion is the ―other‖ of
international law.‖58 In all societies, however, religious communities
are internally contested, heterogeneous, and constantly evolving
through internal debate and interaction with outsiders. In questioning
the traditional liberal construction of this category, Sunder refers to
recent attempts by human rights groups (especially in non-Western
contexts) to construct and realize a ―new enlightenment‖ which seeks
reason, equality, and liberty not just in the public sphere, but also in

culture give themselves for the importance of their cultural practices may be particular, the
―external reasons‖ they give to their fellow citizens are general and public; and (4) upholding
the democratic ideal requires a mutual openness and respect towards the views and claims of
others in order to discover and revise the unreflective partiality in one‘s own views through
dialogue. Id. at 108–110.
57. As Tully observes, Barry‘s conception of democratic dialogue is so ―constrained by
the preemptory [sic] universality of his own theory that there is little room to discuss
diversity under his category of exemptions to general rules. This monological stance is not
only wrong in theory; it also leads to the transformation of reasonable disagreement into
ideological conflict and hence to instability in practice.‖ Id. at 110 (citations omitted).
58. Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1402 (2003).

11 DANCHIN (DO NOT DELETE)

2009]

THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE AND RELIGION

4/29/2009 12:46 PM

123

the private spheres of religion, culture, and family.59 By failing to
include such questions within the scope of rights discourse, the law of
human rights in effect has deferred to the authoritarian claims of
patriarchal, religious elites thereby buttressing their power vis-à-vis
the claims of women‘s rights activists.
Of course, any such claims raise complex and difficult conflicts
between equality norms on the one hand, and religious and cultural
freedom norms on the other. A value pluralist approach to such
questions opens the possibility of new forms of the hermeneutic
circle and thus diverse forms of fusion of horizons. This, in turn,
opens the way to a less dogmatic and binary account of reason and
religion by viewing both as human institutions and social practices
requiring modes of justification and accountability. Just as is the case
with the doctrine of substantive neutrality, this requires the constant
search for forms of accommodation, mutual understanding, and
overlapping consensus between actual religious communities and the
normative claims of rights discourse understood in value pluralist and
philosophically hermeneutic terms. In order for this to occur,
however, the primary obstacle, the inability of Western rights
theorists to see their culture as one amongst others, must be
surpassed. As Taylor concludes:
To an extent, Westerners see their human rights doctrine as
arising simply out of the falling away of previous countervailing ideas . . . that have now been discredited to leave the
field free for the preoccupations with human life, freedom, the
avoidance of suffering. To this extent they will tend to think
that the path to convergence requires that others too cast off
their traditional ideas, that they even reject their religious
heritage, and become ―unmarked‖ moderns like us. Only if we
in the West can recapture a more adequate view of our own

59. Id. at 1403. Sunder notes that women in many non-Western contexts now challenge
religious and cultural authorities and seek to re-imagine religious community on more
egalitarian and democratic terms. These efforts are different from the women‘s rights
movement in the West, which offers women a right to religious freedom (on patriarchal,
religious leaders‘ terms) or a right to equality (within the public sphere and without
normative community), but not a comprehensive right to both. Thus, ―[e]nvisioning a third
way, women human rights activists in Muslim communities are pursuing equality and
freedom within the context of religion, not just without it.‖ Id. at 1404. Sunder refers, in
particular, to the transnational solidarity network ―Women Living Under Muslim Laws.‖ Id.
at 1433–43.
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history, can we learn to understand better the spiritual ideas
that have been interwoven in our development and hence be
prepared to understand sympathetically the spiritual paths of
others toward the converging goal.60

60. Taylor, supra note 20, at 143–44. Given the logic of philosophical hermeneutics, any
overlapping consensus or modus vivendi that may evolve over time will not therefore be
achieved through a ―loss or denial of traditions all around, but rather by creative
reimmersions of different groups, each with their own spiritual heritage, traveling different
routes to the same goal.‖ Id. at 144.

